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THE THREAT OF “CLAIR
MOTIONS”: MARTEL V. CLAIR
AND THE STANDARD FOR
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL IN
FEDERAL HABEAS PETITIONS
LEE CZOCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Martel v. Clair, the Supreme Court will once again confront the
conflict between promoting the fair imposition of the death penalty
and ensuring the finality of criminal sentences. On one hand, the State
of California has pursued the execution of its judgment against
2
Kenneth Clair for nineteen years. On the other hand, Clair has spent
3
those years repeatedly contesting the State’s lack of evidence. When
Clair requested to substitute his legal counsel during federal habeas
corpus proceedings, questions about the appropriate standard for
substitution of counsel in federal capital habeas cases exacerbated the
conflict. The resolution of Martel, therefore, likely will feature that
tension and depend on which the Court finds more compelling: the
recent trend in habeas litigation of limiting opportunities for relief or
the availability of substitution of counsel for non-capital petitioners.
II. FACTS
In 1994, the Respondent, Kenneth Clair, filed a federal habeas
corpus petition contesting his 1987 state conviction of murder with
the special circumstance of burglary, for which he received the death
4
penalty. After exhausting state remedies, Clair returned to federal
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Clair v. Ayres, 403 Fed. App’x 276, 279 (9th Cir. 2010), cert granted sub nom. Martel v.
Clair, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No. 10-1265).
2. See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 4, Martel v. Clair, No. 10-1265 (U.S. Sept. 9,
2011) (stating that the California Supreme Court affirmed Clair’s death sentence in 1992).
3. Id. at 4–12.
4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Martel, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (No. 10-1265).
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court to litigate his case with a court-appointed federal public
5
defender (FPD). The habeas petition included claims of juror
misconduct and procedural and strategic errors made by trial counsel
6
at both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial.
On March 16, 2005, Clair sent a letter to the district court
7
expressing his dissatisfaction with the FPD’s treatment of his case.
The district court asked both parties to “state their positions
8
concerning the letter.” On April 26, the FPD informed the court of
Clair’s willingness for counsel to continue his representation, but that
Clair reserved the right to “reexamine the issue of representation at
9
the conclusion of the proceeding in [the District] Court.” In light of
this communication, the court took no further action on Clair’s
10
letter.
Clair again requested the appointment of new counsel in a letter
11
dated June 16, 2005. Clair reasserted his prior grievances and added
a new allegation: that his counsel had failed to pursue physical
12
evidence once it was made available by the State. Fourteen days
later, the district court declined to substitute counsel, noting that “it
appear[ed] that petitioner’s counsel [was] doing a proper job” and “no
13
conflict of interest or inadequacy of counsel [was] shown.” On the
same day, the court issued an order rejecting all of Clair’s habeas
14
claims.
The FPD filed a notice of appeal from the denial of Clair’s habeas
petition and Clair filed a pro se notice of appeal from the denial of his
15
motion to substitute counsel. Responding to an inquiry from the
Ninth Circuit, the FPD expressed an inability to continue working
16
with Clair. The court construed the communication as a motion to
17
withdraw––which it granted––and appointed new counsel for Clair.

5. Id.
6. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Martel, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (No.
10-1265).
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6.
8. Joint App’x at 18, Martel, No. 10-1265 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2011).
9. Id. at 26–27.
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6.
11. Joint App’x, supra note 8, at 62–63.
12. Id. at 62–70.
13. Id. at 61.
14. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 3.
15. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 7–8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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While the appeal from the denial of the habeas petition was
pending, Clair’s new counsel filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
judgment on the grounds of newly discovered, untested evidence and
the district court’s improper denial of Clair’s request for new federal
18
19
habeas counsel. The district court denied the motion on the merits,
holding that Clair failed to explain how the desired testing would
20
advance any of the claims in his habeas petition. After the district
court’s denial of the 60(b) motion, state post-conviction proceedings
resulted in DNA testing of the physical evidence, which revealed
21
fingerprints and male DNA that did not belong to Clair. Clair
22
appealed the denial of his 60(b) motion.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although the Supreme Court has determined that the
constitutional right to counsel enjoyed by criminal defendants at trial
23
does not apply to habeas petitioners, Congress has exercised its
legislative discretion to provide capital petitioners with a statutory
24
entitlement to counsel. Congress did not articulate the appropriate
standard for substitution of counsel, leading courts to question
whether it should be based on the standard for inadequate
performance at trial, the standard for discretionary appointments of
counsel, or, perhaps, a different standard completely. Nevertheless,
Congress has expressed its intent both to reduce delays in habeas
proceedings and to improve fairness in implementing the death
25
penalty.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 9.
21. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 12–13.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
24. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3006A, 3599 (West 2011).
25. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (stating that the purpose of
AEDPA was “to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences,
particularly in capital cases” in view of principles of “comity, finality and federalism” (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000) (Stevens, J.))); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849,
855 (1994) (noting that Congress intended petitioners to have access to “quality legal
representation”).
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A. The Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial
26

Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “the
27
effective assistance of competent counsel.” To obtain relief from an
adverse judgment based on counsel’s inadequate performance, a
criminal appellant must show both a deficient performance and a
28
resulting prejudice. First, counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls
29
below an objective standard of reasonableness. For example, the
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel mandates that counsel
“make reasonable investigations” or “make a reasonable decision that
30
makes particular investigations unnecessary.” In assessing counsel’s
performance, courts must strive to “eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight . . . and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective
31
at the time.” Courts are “highly deferential,” therefore, when
scrutinizing counsels’ decisions and begin with a presumption that
32
they were reasonable.
Second, even if the defendant’s representation was objectively
unreasonable, in order to gain relief from judgment, the
33
representation must have been so poor as to prejudice the outcome.
In certain contexts, such prejudice is so likely that a case-by-case
34
inquiry is unnecessary and courts will assume prejudice. For
35
example, actual or constructive denial of counsel, state interference
36
37
with counsel’s assistance, and an actual conflict of interest all
38
present circumstances under which prejudice is presumed. Aside
from these extraordinary contexts, however, the defendant normally
must show more than a “conceivable effect on the outcome of the

26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
28. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
29. Id. at 687–88.
30. Id. at 691.
31. Id. at 689.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 687.
34. Id. at 692.
35. For example, prejudice is presumed where counsel fails to file a notice of appeal
without the respondent’s consent. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 473, 484 (2000).
36. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 (2011) (holding that an order
preventing the defendant from consulting his counsel during an overnight recess was
prejudicial).
37. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978) (holding that “whenever a
trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection, reversal is
automatic”).
38. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
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39

proceeding.” The benchmark for determining prejudice is whether
counsel “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
40
result.”
B. The Right to Counsel and the Standard for Substitution in PostConviction Proceedings
There is no constitutional right to counsel when petitioning for
41
habeas corpus relief. A habeas petitioner’s due process rights are
“not parallel to a trial right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the
fact that he has already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a
42
43
limited interest in post-conviction relief.” In Pennsylvania v. Finley,
the Supreme Court held that providing prisoners assistance of counsel
in post-conviction proceedings does not require “the full panoply of
procedural protections that the Constitution requires” for criminal
44
trials and appeals. This leaves legislatures with substantial discretion
45
in their choices regarding post-conviction assistance of counsel.
Congress set forth the basic scheme for federal habeas corpus
46
writs contesting state custody in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under that statute,
subsection (i) provides that the ineffectiveness of counsel during postconviction proceedings is not a ground for relief in § 2254
47
proceedings. Separate provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2261 govern certain
48
expedited capital cases, and although they mirror § 2254’s preclusion
of relief for ineffectiveness of counsel, the provisions also stipulate
that the limit on relief shall not prevent the replacement of ineffective
49
counsel.
The rules governing assistance of counsel for indigent federal
50
habeas petitioners are set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A and 3599.
Section 3006A allows courts discretion to appoint counsel for indigent

39.
40.
41.
42.
(2009).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 693.
Id. at 686.
See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7–15 (1989).
Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320
481 U.S. 551 (1987).
Id. at 559.
Id.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2011).
Id. § 2254(i).
Id. § 2261.
Id. § 2261(e).
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3006A, 3599 (West 2011).
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non-capital defendants and provides for substitution of counsel in the
51
interests of justice. That discretion does not extend to capital
defendants, who have a mandatory right to assistance of counsel
52
under § 3599. The statutory entitlement arose out of Congress’s
desire to “promot[e] fundamental fairness in the imposition of the
death penalty” by providing capital habeas defendants with “quality
53
legal representation.”
Although both statutes provide for
substitution of counsel, § 3599, unlike § 3006A, does not articulate a
54
standard for when substitution is appropriate.
C. AEDPA’s Effect on Habeas Petitions
Courts and legislatures alike have been concerned about the
abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. Those concerns, apparent in
55
judicial decisions, spurred the enactment of the Antiterrorism and
56
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The Act’s purpose is “to
reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences,
57
particularly in capital cases” in view of principles of “comity, finality
58
and federalism.”
AEDPA imposes significant restrictions on a prisoner’s second or
subsequent habeas petitions. First, courts must dismiss any claim
59
already adjudicated in relation to a previous petition. Second, any
new claims must be dismissed unless they “rel[y] on either a new and
retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high

51. Id. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), (c).
52. Id. § 3599. Capital petitioner’s right to counsel was previously located at § 848(q), but
was recodified without other changes by the Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of 2005,
PUB. L. NO. 109-177, § 222, 120 Stat. 230, 231.
53. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855, 859 (1994).
54. See § 3599(e) (“Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s own
motion or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appointed shall represent the
defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings . . . .”).
55. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991) (“The doctrine of abuse of the
writ defines the circumstances in which federal courts decline to entertain a claim presented for
the first time in a second or subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”); Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) (stating that federal habeas is not “a means by which a
defendant is entitled to delay an execution indefinitely”).
56. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
57. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 386 (2000) (Stevens, J.)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-23 at 10 (1995) (“[C]apital defendants
and their counsel have a unique incentive to keep litigation going by any possible means.”).
58. Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)).
59. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529–30 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(1)
(West 2011)).
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probability of actual innocence.” These restrictions apply to Rule
60(b) motions, which present new claims for relief, present new
evidence in support of a claim already litigated, or rely on a purported
61
change in the substantive law. Furthermore, even in some
circumstances where AEDPA does not govern, “a court of appeals
must exercise its discretion in a manner consistent with the objects of
62
the statute.”
The Supreme Court has yet to determine which standard is
applicable to capital habeas petitioners, and Congress has not given
direction more explicit than the observed dual purposes of ensuring
fairness and reducing delays.
IV. HOLDING
63

The Ninth Circuit consolidated Clair’s appeals. The court
distinguished between a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
64
and a claim that the district court failed to exercise its discretion,
treating Clair’s appeal of the district court’s denial of his habeas
65
petition as the latter. Because it ruled favorably on this claim, the
court did not reach Clair’s appeal of the denial of his Rule 60(b)
66
motion or his request to file a successive petition.
Although § 3599 does not provide a standard for substitution of
counsel, the court determined that Congress must have intended
capital petitioners to have at least as much opportunity to substitute
67
their counsel as non-capital petitioners. This determination arose out
of the importance Congress placed on providing capital petitioners
with “quality legal representation” due to the “seriousness of the
68
possible penalty.” To effectuate Congress’s intent, the court applied
the interests-of-justice standard—the same standard applied to

60. Id. (citing U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(2) (West 2011)).
61. Id. at 531.
62. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554 (1998) (exercising discretion consistent
with the objectives of AEDPA by holding that a motion to recall mandate was a successive
petition).
63. Brief for Respondent at 14, Martel v. Clair, No. 10-1265 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2011). Clair
appealed the denials of his request for substitution of counsel and his rule 60(b) motion as well
as requested leave to file a successive petition. Id. at 12–14.
64. Clair v. Ayers, 403 Fed. App’x 276, 279 (9th Cir. 2010).
65. Id. at 277, 279.
66. See id. at 279.
67. Id. at 277–78.
68. Id. (quoting McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855 (1994)).
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substitution of counsel requests for non-capital habeas defendants.
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion
either by failing to apply the interests-of-justice standard or by
70
applying it in “an implausible, illogical or unreasonable manner.”
According to the Ninth Circuit, the untested physical evidence
allegedly located by Clair’s private investigator “was potentially of
71
great importance to Clair’s habeas petition.” The court noted that
Clair’s conviction “was based on circumstantial evidence” before
72
DNA testing was prevalent. Because Clair’s allegations “implicated
the fairness of the proceeding,” assessing whether substitution of
counsel was in the interests of justice necessitated some inquiry into
73
those allegations. By not investigating, the district court abused its
74
discretion in denying the motion “without explanation.”
According to the court, the district court’s abuse of discretion
“foreclosed the possibility that different counsel” might have taken
steps that would lead to incorporating the new evidence into Clair’s
75
original habeas petition. The court therefore vacated the denial of
Clair’s request for new counsel and the subsequent denial of his
76
habeas petition. The court then determined “the most reasonable
solution” was to treat Clair’s current counsel as if he were the counsel
who might have been appointed had the district court properly
77
exercised its discretion. The appellate court also directed the district
court to consider any submissions, “including any requests from
counsel to amend the petition to add claims based on or related to the
78
new evidence,” as if made prior to the vacated ruling.
V. ARGUMENTS
The dispute in Martel v. Clair has two dimensions. First, the State
and Clair disagree about which standard should govern substitution
69. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (West 2011)).
70. Id. at 278.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court noted that Clair’s 60(b) motion raised similar issues, but that such
motions are adjudicated under a standard less favorable to Clair. Id. at 279 n.1.
76. Id. at 279.
77. Id. (citing Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1301–02 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing a new
attorney to advance claims the previous attorney overlooked to avoid the unfair result of having
to raise them in a subsequent petition)).
78. Id.

CZOCHER FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE THREAT OF “CLAIR MOTIONS”

2/26/2012 11:34 AM

159

of counsel for capital habeas petitioners. The State argues that
substitution is only appropriate in three specific circumstances. Clair
counters that the more generous interests-of-justice standard should
apply. Second, assuming the interests-of-justice standard did apply, the
parties disagree over whether the district court abused its discretion
and whether the Ninth Circuit should have remanded for a more
limited inquiry.
A. Determining the Standard for Substitution of Counsel
The State argues that substitution of counsel in capital habeas
cases is available only when a petitioner promptly complains that his
counsel (1) is unqualified under the statute; (2) has a disabling conflict
79
of interest; or (3) has completely abandoned the case. To advance
this restrictive standard, the State claims that concerns about the
abuse of habeas corpus apply with particular force to petitioners’
80
motions to substitute counsel. The State argues that these concerns,
in conjunction with Congress’s approach of creating separate
statutory schemes for appointment of counsel in capital and noncapital cases, mandate an exacting standard for substitution of counsel
81
in cases like Clair’s.
According to the State, because traditional concerns of abuse cast
suspicion on delay, limits on the ability to substitute counsel are
embedded in the statutory scheme governing appointment of
82
counsel. First, the State argues that by removing the appointment of
counsel in capital habeas petitions from the discretionary purview of
the district courts, Congress “singled out” such cases for “unique
treatment” and intended “to create a separate system of specialized
83
rules.” The State substantiates its theory of separate systems by
pointing to statutory differences between capital and non-capital
84
appointment of counsel. For example, only non-capital appointment
of counsel statutes stipulate an interests-of-justice standard for

79. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 17. The State also asserts that “habeas
counsel does not abandon a client as long as counsel independently reviews the record of the
case.” Id. at 38 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558 (1987)).
80. Id. at 20–22.
81. Id. at 31–32.
82. Id. at 22.
83. Id. at 24.
84. See id. at 25 (emphasizing differences in required qualifications, the timing of
appointment and expense authorization, counsel compensation, and representation in state
proceedings).
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85

substituting counsel.
Second, despite the lack of “explicit guidance” from the statute,
the State characterizes § 3599(e) as implying a higher standard than
86
that in non-capital collateral attacks. The State rationalizes
Congress’s neglect to articulate the higher standard as a result of its
presumed awareness that there is no constitutional right to effective
87
assistance of counsel in habeas petitions. Congress therefore could
have assumed that appointed counsel’s performance would not be
88
open to attacks for ineffective assistance. Additionally, the statute
contemplates, according to the State, “long-term appointments of
indefinite duration,” thus evincing an intention to “minimize the
89
necessity and the occasion for substitution of counsel.” Finally, the
State argues that although both §§ 2254 and 2261 specify that
ineffectiveness of counsel during post-conviction proceedings is not a
ground for relief, only the latter stipulates that this limit will not
90
preclude the appointment of different counsel on such grounds. This
difference suggests that Congress did not intend for ineffectiveness of
91
counsel to be a ground for substitution.
The State also makes numerous policy overtures, emphasizing that
substitution of counsel, unless limited in scope, would have a
92
“deleterious effect” on the timeliness of litigation. Both the Supreme
Court and members of Congress have noted that an impending
93
execution incentivizes delay. Given the frequency with which
disagreements arise between defendants and their counsel, petitioners
94
would have no difficulty formulating a pretext for such motions. The
State warns that if substitution of counsel then becomes widely
available, capital habeas petitioners would readily exploit this new
95
avenue for delay with “Clair motions.”

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 26 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987) (finding that habeas
petitioners do not have a constitutional right to effective assistance of appointed counsel);
Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2561 (2010) (stating that Congress is presumed to be aware
of prevailing law)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 25–26.
90. Id. at 27.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 21.
93. Id. at 20–21.
94. Id. at 21–22.
95. Id. at 17.
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In response, Clair advances three primary arguments. First, Clair
rejects the State’s proposed standard and argues that § 3599’s “roots
in Section 3006A support the continued use” of the interests-of96
justice standard for both capital and non-capital habeas cases.
Second, Clair asserts that there is no basis in either the text or the
legislative history to believe that Congress wished to depart from this
97
familiar and workable standard. Third, the interests-of-justice
standard, properly administered, takes into account all of the State’s
98
asserted interests and the capital prisoner’s incentive to delay.
Although Clair agrees that special rules govern capital cases, Clair
frames the alternate structure as Congress’s attempt “to be more
solicitous of capital defendants’ greater need for the assistance of
99
well-qualified counsel.” Clair construes the heightened qualifications
and economic support for counsel in capital cases as evidence that
Congress “expanded the scope of the right [to post-conviction
representation] beyond what the Sixth Amendment requires in
100
criminal trials.”
Congress’s intent to “promot[e] fundamental
fairness in the imposition of the death penalty” by providing capital
habeas defendants with “quality legal representation,” Clair argues,
suggests that the Court of Appeals correctly borrowed the interests101
of-justice standard from 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
Clair points out that borrowing the standard from § 3006A follows
102
the Supreme Court’s approach in McFarland v. Scott, in which the
103
Court looked to § 3599’s predecessor in construing the statute. Clair
emphasizes that “[n]othing in the new provision” suggests a departure
from the interests-of-justice standard that applied to discretionary
104
appointment. The State’s argument, Clair asserts, requires an
untenable assumption that “Congress silently made it more difficult
105
for a capital defendant to seek substitution of counsel.”

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 25.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 18, 22 (quoting McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855, 859 (1994)).
512 U.S. 849 (1994).
Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id.
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To underscore the appropriateness of the standard, Clair points to
106
its “added advantages of familiarity and administrability.” The
standard appears in multiple contexts in criminal adjudication and
courts of appeals are familiar with reviewing its application for abuses
107
of discretion. According to Clair, because the interests-of-justice
standard is so common and workable in the criminal context, “there is
no basis for concluding that Congress silently prescribed some new
108
and different standard for Section 3599.”
Clair concedes that the three factors in the State’s test “may well
be relevant,” but argues that restricting a court’s consideration to
these factors “has no basis in the statute and makes no practical
109
sense.” Clair notes that no court has ever adopted a test similar to
110
the State’s “novel” three-part test. Furthermore, the State “cites no
language in Section 3599 or Section 3006A to support its exclusive
111
three-factor test.” According to Clair, the State’s construction would
render the “express provision” for substitution of counsel “virtually
112
meaningless.” Because the capital habeas petitioner is statutorily
entitled to assistance of counsel, a provision that provides for new
counsel when he has been completely denied his statutory right to
113
counsel is superfluous.
Clair also argues that the State misinterprets § 2254(i) to bar more
114
relief than Congress intended. Although the State is correct that
barring relief on these grounds was unnecessary, Clair argues that
Congress was simply codifying the Supreme Court’s decision in
115
Pennsylvania v. Finley. The State’s contrary reading that something
116
more was intended is therefore unsupportable. If § 2254(i) restricts
substitution of counsel to the three scenarios the State proposes, noncapital habeas cases, presumably, would also be subject to this
117
standard. This result, however, is inconsistent with § 3006A’s

106. Id. at 22.
107. Id. at 22–23.
108. Id. at 23.
109. Id. at 24.
110. Id. at 24–25.
111. Id. at 25.
112. Id. at 26.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 28–29.
115. Id. Congress codified Supreme Court holdings throughout AEDPA. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 29 (noting that § 2254(i) applies to any proceeding under § 2254, including noncapital habeas cases).

CZOCHER FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/26/2012 11:34 AM

163

THE THREAT OF “CLAIR MOTIONS”
118

provision for substitution of counsel in the interests of justice.
Nor does § 2261(e)’s express reservation of the ability to
substitute counsel on grounds of ineffective assistance suggest that
119
such substitution would not be available under § 3599. Because §
2261 also governs certain state post-conviction proceedings, Clair
construes the reservation as “merely negat[ing] any possible
implication that Congress intended to preclude trial courts from
120
removing and replacing incompetent counsel.” Clair argues that this
stipulation “reinforces that a petitioner in a case ‘arising under section
2254,’ but subject to the . . . special rules [for expedited capital cases],
retains the protections that otherwise apply outside” the context of
121
expedited cases. Such protection includes the ability to substitute
122
counsel where consistent with the interests of justice.
Finally, Clair contests the State’s prediction that habeas
123
petitioners will abuse the lower standard to delay proceedings.
Because the interests-of-justice standard does not automatically
entitle a defendant to appointment of new counsel—the district court
can exercise its discretion only after due inquiry—Clair claims the
124
standard will not result in unwarranted delay. Clair argues that
courts regularly deny substitution of counsel on grounds such as “the
prospect of unreasonable delay, lack of evidence of a serious
breakdown of the attorney-client relationship, and any likelihood that
substitution would be pointless in light of the status of proceedings or
125
the weakness of the defendant’s claims.” Therefore, exercising
discretion would include consideration of all of the interests the State
126
advances in its challenge to the interests-of-justice standard.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Review of the District Court for Abuse of
Discretion
According to the State, even if the interests-of-justice standard
127
does apply, the district court’s denial of Clair’s motion should stand.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 31.
Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 42.
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The Ninth Circuit’s holding rested on the district court’s lack of
investigation into Clair’s second request, but the State argues that
there is no duty to conduct an inquiry unless a conflict of interest is
128
alleged. Furthermore, the State argues that the Ninth Circuit’s
formulation of the interests of justice was biased in favor of the
petitioner because it did not require consideration of the
129
countervailing values of finality, comity, and federalism. Because the
Ninth Circuit unnecessarily vacated the district court’s judgment, it is
apparent that they did not afford proper weight to these competing
values. Instead, the court should have remanded for a limited inquiry
under the new district court judge as to whether substitution is
130
required in the interests of justice.
The State’s proposed application of the interests-of-justice
standard would require only that counsel comport with due process.
The State argues that the actions of Clair’s counsel—“filing a petition,
doing discovery, and conducting an evidentiary hearing”—fully
131
comply with the demands of due process. Furthermore, the State
asserts that Clair’s claims regarding untested physical evidence would
not be relevant to an error at trial, nor would the evidence undermine
what the State regards as the key piece of evidence—a recorded,
132
incriminating conversation between Clair and a witness. Even if
Clair’s counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, Clair could not show the deficiency prejudiced his
133
petition.
Conversely, Clair argues the Court of Appeals correctly applied
134
the abuse-of-discretion standard. Clair notes that exercise of
135
discretion requires an accurate knowledge of the relevant facts.
Furthermore, articulating the effect of those facts is especially
necessary for appellate review, where discretion involves weighing

128. Id. at 40 (citing Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168–76 (2002)).
129. Id. at 45–46.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 47–48. The State cites Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558–59 (1987), to
support its claim that it is sufficient “if statutorily appointed competent habeas counsel
conduct[s] independent review of the record and report[s] no arguable issues.” Petitioner’s Brief
on the Merits, supra note 2, at 48.
132. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 51–52.
133. See id. at 58–59 (“[T]he record makes it clear that the refusal to replace counsel did not
prejudice Clair.”).
134. Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 33.
135. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972)).
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multiple competing considerations. According to Clair, the district
court did not fulfill either of these obligations, and therefore abused
137
its discretion.
According to Clair, the district court’s ignorance of all relevant
facts was apparent in the court’s disparate responses on the two
138
occasions Clair complained about his counsel. In response to Clair’s
first letter, the court directed counsel and the State to respond, acting
only after receiving communication from counsel that the matter had
139
been resolved to Clair’s satisfaction. In contrast, after receiving
Clair’s second letter with additional detail and new allegations, “the
court did not solicit any response from counsel or otherwise
140
undertake to inform itself of the surrounding facts.” Clair asserts
that the district court was “obliged to make at least some minimal
inquiry by asking counsel to respond” in order to make an informed
141
decision. By failing to do so the court essentially failed to exercise
142
its discretion at all.
Clair also defends vacating the rejection of his habeas claims and
rejects the State’s assertion that the remedy entitles him to reopen his
143
case. Clair argues that the remedy was warranted by “an unusual
problem posed by the idiosyncratic facts of this case” and would not
144
permit an end-run around AEDPA. Although remanding solely on
the question of substitution of counsel ordinarily would be
appropriate, it would have been inappropriate in Clair’s case because
his counsel had already withdrawn and his new lawyer had spent five
145
years on the case. Clair notes that the decision to treat Clair’s
current counsel as the one that might have been appointed at the time
146
does not entitle him to amend his petition or add claims. Instead,
Clair’s requests to amend will be governed by the ordinary standard
147
for amending petitions. Therefore, the State’s arguments that Clair’s
possible claims lack substantive merit should be determined by the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 33–34 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 39, 41.
Id. at 39–40.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
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district court, which will retain the power to deny any motion to
148
amend.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
The Supreme Court is unlikely to limit substitution of counsel in
habeas proceedings to the three circumstances proposed by the State.
149
In addition to Clair’s argument that the test lacks a textual basis, the
standard’s source clearly contemplates “actual or constructive denial
150
of counsel” in situations besides those listed by the State. The State’s
standard ignores situations where prejudice is present, but not
151
presumed. Furthermore, requiring complete abandonment of a
152
case involves an inferential leap that the State has not justified. To
say that Congress does not have to provide habeas petitioners with
153
“the full panoply” of Sixth Amendment rights does not necessitate
154
reducing the provision of “quality legal representation” to a mere
155
independent review of the record. Although the State correctly
156
notes concerns about abuse and delay, it has not shown that its
157
proposed standard is necessary to protect those interests.
Instead, the Supreme Court likely will adopt the interests-ofjustice standard because it sufficiently accounts for finality, comity,
and federalism concerns and has support in the legislative history of
§ 3599. Given that the entitlement to counsel in § 3599 evolved out of
158
the discretionary appointment of counsel in § 3006A, it makes sense

148. Id. at 41.
149. Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 21–22.
150. See Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (referring to situations besides
the presumptively prejudicial that may present an actual ineffectiveness claim).
151. See id. at 693 (noting that except in those scenarios where prejudice is presumed,
“actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a
general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice”).
152. The State maintains that substitution of counsel is inappropriate in all but three
circumstances, one of which is complete abandonment of a client. See Petitioner’s Brief on the
Merits, supra note 2, at 38 (“[C]ounsel does not completely abandon a client as long as counsel
independently reviews the record of the case.” (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558
(1987))).
153. Finley, 481 U.S. at 559.
154. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855 (1994).
155. See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 37 (suggesting that an
independent review of the record suffices).
156. Id. at 21.
157. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–19, Martel v. Clair, No. 10-1265 (U.S. Dec.
11, 2011) (Sotomayor, J.) (asking the State’s counsel to name one district or circuit court case in
which its restrictive standard was adopted).
158. Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 25.
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to retain the provision’s standard until Congress indicates otherwise.
It is conceivable that Congress would want to limit incentives for
159
delay. But Congress recodified § 3599’s predecessor to its present
location without specifying a new standard for substitution of
160
counsel, and the interests-of-justice standard is already common in
161
the criminal context. Therefore, retaining this standard may be the
162
most reasonable course. Furthermore, as Clair argues, the interestsof-justice standard is perfectly capable of accommodating concerns
163
about delay and abuse.
In reviewing the district court’s application of the interests-ofjustice standard, the Ninth Circuit walked a fine line between
requiring inquiry and requiring second-guessing of litigation strategy.
Counsel must be entitled to “make a reasonable decision that makes
164
particular investigations unnecessary,” but the panel’s emphasis on
165
the potential importance of the evidence suggests a determination
166
about the FPD’s investigative decisions only possible with hindsight.
Even though conversing with Clair may have led the FPD to conclude
167
that “pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless,” the district
168
court did not inquire into whether this was indeed the case.

159. Although Clair argues that there is no basis for believing Congress wished to depart
from that standard, id. at 22–23, that assertion is at odds with Congress’s observation that
“capital defendants . . . have a unique incentive to keep litigation going by any possible means.”
H.R. REP. NO. 104-23 at 10 (1995).
160. See supra note 52.
161. Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 23.
162. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 18–19 (Kennedy, J.) (predicting
that the standard the Court ultimately formulates will closely resemble the interests-of-justice
standard).
163. Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 42; see Lindsay R. Goldstein, A View from the
Bench: Why Judges Fail to Protect Trust and Confidence in the Lawyer-Client Relationship—An
Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2678–79 (2005) (suggesting that
available cases reveal four factors common to analysis of motions to substitute counsel: “(1) the
timeliness of the motion, (2) the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the matter, (3) the extent
of the conflict between the attorney and client and whether it was so great that it resulted in a
total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense, and (4) the balancing of these
factors with the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice” (quoting
United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2001))). But see Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 157, at 49 (Alito, J.) (noting that because the interests-of-justice standard is so open
ended, denying substitution of counsel would seldom constitute an abuse of discretion).
164. Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
165. Clair v. Ayers, 403 F. App’x 276, 278 (9th Cir. 2010).
166. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (holding that in assessing counsel’s performance, courts
must strive to “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel’s perspective at the time”).
167. Id. at 691.
168. Id.
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Furthermore, the FPD’s response to the district court’s first inquiry
about Clair’s dissatisfaction with his counsel did not evince such a
169
conclusion.
The inquiry into the application of the standard, therefore, likely
will turn on whether the Supreme Court considers mandatory inquiry
too onerous a burden. Clair is likely to prevail on this question. The
State lists cases to support its proposition that there is no obligation
to conduct formal inquiries after a defendant’s request for new
170
counsel, but the selected cases discuss only the duty to investigate
171
alleged conflicts of interest. Clair argues that the exercise of
discretion requires an accurate knowledge of the relevant facts, which
logically suggests that a court should be certain it has those facts
172
before exercising discretion. This certainty is only possible after at
least some inquiry.
The State’s argument with the most traction is that the Ninth
Circuit should have remanded for a limited inquiry as to whether
173
substitution was required in the interests of justice. Although Clair’s
desire for different counsel had become moot, the question whether
he was entitled to new counsel had not. Presumably, if Clair was not
entitled to new counsel, then there was no error in denying his habeas
petition. Regardless of the time that his new counsel spent on the
174
case, if Clair was not entitled to substitution of counsel at all, his
claims would still be subject to the more exacting standard of
successive petitions. This is especially relevant in light of the State’s
argument that the Ninth Circuit did not consider the countervailing
175
values of finality, comity, and federalism. Particularly worrisome is
Clair’s admission, after his first complaint about the FPD, that he
“may reexamine the issue of representation at the conclusion of the
176
proceeding in [the District] Court.” Postponing a final decision
about his counsel until the conclusion of proceedings suggests exactly

169. See Joint App’x, supra note 8, at 26–27 (including no mention of a determination that
investigation was unnecessary).
170. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 40 (citing Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162, 168–76 (2002); Wilson v. Parker, 515 F.3d 682, 695 (6th Cir. 2008)).
171. E.g., Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175.
172. Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 34.
173. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 46–47.
174. Clair’s new counsel had spent five years on the case when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Id.
175. Id. at 45–46.
176. Joint App’x, supra note 8, at 26–27.
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the gamesmanship the State predicts “Clair motions” will facilitate.
There is probably little practical difference, however, between the
proposed remedies in Clair’s case. The relevance of the unpursued
physical evidence is the basis for both Clair’s request for new counsel
and his desire to amend his petition. If the evidence is significant
enough to allow amending his petition, it is likely that it is significant
enough that his counsel reasonably should have pursued it, producing
the same result either way.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although it was the possibility of a flood of “Clair motions” that
urged settling the question of the standard in the first place, the
consequences of the Ninth Circuit’s holding are unlikely to be so dire.
If the remedy the Ninth Circuit fashioned was not limited to the
unique circumstances of Clair’s case, more concern might be
warranted. Properly applied, however, the interests-of-justice
standard should prevent end-runs around AEDPA and adequately
protect the interest in finality.

177. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 17. The State’s concerns about
gamesmanship were a centerpiece of oral arguments, at which some of the Justices appeared
dissatisfied with the notion that Clair could invoke a duty to inquire into the attorney-client
relationship at such a late stage; or concerned that the Ninth Circuit’s remand placed Clair in a
better position than he would have been had counsel been substituted in the original
proceedings. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 45–47 (Roberts, J.)
(questioning whether the motion would allow petitioners to “circumvent various restrictions”);
id. at 50–53 (Kagan, J., and Alito, J.) questioning the practical difference new counsel would
have made).

